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CONTRACTING ON THE WEB: COLLEGIATE ATHLETES AND
SPORTS AGENTS CONFRONT A NEW HURDLE IN
CLOSING THE DEAL
MANPREET S. DHANjAL,* DANIEL S. STRICK** &
MARK A. CONRAD***
I. INTRODUCTION
The role of intercollegiate athletics at colleges and universities
has undergone a dramatic change since the inception of the Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") in 1906,1 generat-
ing millions of dollars in revenue for universities. 2 At the same
time, the widespread use of computers - in businesses, schools,
homes and government - and the explosive growth of the Internet
and the World Wide Web has generated new and challenging legal
issues. The National Law Journal, in a September 23, 1996 editorial,
stated that "'netizens' are everywhere and nowhere" and recom-
mended the adoption of "cyber-rules" to cope with the novel proce-
dural issues spawned by the digital domain.3 One such new issue is
drafting and enforcing contracts made over the Internet.
If a sports agent were to draft a contract with a student-athlete
over the Internet, which court would have jurisdiction over any con-
troversies arising out of that contract? Does the NCAA have any
regulations regarding student-athletes contracting over the
Internet?
This Article examines the challenges facing sports agents and
collegiate athletes when contracting over the Internet. Part II gives
* Rutgers College, Rutgers University, B.A.; Villanova University School of
Law, J.D.
** Brandeis University, B.A.; Villanova University School of Law, J.D.
Associate Professor, Legal and Ethical Studies, School of Business, Ford-
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1. See The History of the NCAA, at http://www.ncaa.org/about/history.html
(last visited Mar. 19, 2001) (detailing historical development of NCAA).
2. See Kyle Parks, Marketing Madness Series: The Final Four: St. Petersburg, ST. PE-
TERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 28, 1999, at IB; see also Kenneth L. Shropshire, The Erosion of
the NCAA Amateurism Model, 14 ANTrrRusT 46, 47 (2000) (describing top-level col-
lege football player who generated over $2 million for university over four-year
period).
3. Cyber-Rules Needed, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 23, 1996, at A18 (discussing Internet's
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a brief introduction to the services a sports agent provides to an
athlete.4 Part III discusses traditional personal jurisdiction, fol-
lowed by the developing issues that have arisen in this area with the
creation of the Internet. 5 Part IV discusses traditional contract law,
followed by the unique issues that arise with contracting on the In-
ternet.6 Thereafter, this Article discusses new legislation that is de-
signed to tackle the problems created by contracting over the
Internet.7 Part V discusses how sports agents and student-athletes
who contract over the Internet will be impacted by the NCAA
rules. 8
II. SPORTS AGENTS
Many athletes find the retention of an agent helpful for the
purposes of negotiating contracts, overseeing money management
and soliciting endorsement deals.9 The first true sports agent be-
gan his career in 1965.10 Most notably, the sports agent negotiates
a client's contract with his or her professional team. The relation-
ship between the sports agent and the athlete imposes a duty of
loyalty, good faith and fair dealing on the agent.1 1 In return for the
4. For a further discussion regarding the services that a sports agent provides,
see infra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
5. For a further discussion concerning personal jurisdiction, see infra notes
18-77 and accompanying text.
6. For a further discussion regarding traditional contract law and contracting
on the Internet, see infra notes 78-116 and accompanying text.
7. For a further discussion of new legislation discussing the Internet, see infra
notes 117-59 and accompanying text.
8. For a further discussion describing the NCAA's regulations for sports
agents and student-athletes contracting, see infra notes 160-76 and accompanying
text.
9. See ROBERT M. JARVIS & PHYLLIS COLEMAN, SPORTS LAW CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 443 (1999).
10. See id. at 461 (acknowledging Bob Wolf as first sports agent who began his
career by representing Boston Red Sox pitcher Earl Wilson).
One of the best-known stories about the early days of sports agency in-
volved Green Bay Packers All-Pro center Jim Ringo. When Ringo's agent
called on Packers coach Vince Lombardi to begin negotiating a contract
for the 1964 season, he was asked to wait. A few minutes later, Lombardi
returned and announced, "You've come to the wrong place. Mr. Ringo is
no longer employed by the Packers. He now works for the Philadelphia
Eagles."
Id.
11. See Detroit Lions, Inc. v. Argovitz, 580 F. Supp. 542, 547 (E.D. Mich. 1984)
(citing Anderson v. Griffith, 501 S.W.2d 695, 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973)). The
agent cannot have a personal interest at stake that conflicts with his client's inter-
est in a transaction. See id. (finding that there is violation of that duty when agent
deals on his client's behalf with third party in which agent has interest, like part-
nership in which agent is member). For a further discussion of the impact of
sports agents, see Stephen W. Zucker, Sports Negotiations: The Art of the Contract, 7
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services that the sports agent provides to the athlete, the agent takes
a percentage of the athlete's salary and bonuses. 12
Each of the different professional sports leagues and the NCAA
regulate the activities of sports agents, but in varying degrees. 13
The National Football League Players Association, for example, re-
quires that an agent pass an open book examination before the
agents are permitted to represent any players in the National Foot-
ball League. 14 The NCAA strictly prohibits contracts between stu-
dent-athletes and sports agents. 15 If a contract is made between a
student-athlete and a sports agent, the student-athlete loses all of
his or her remaining NCAA eligibility during the athlete's college
tenure.1 6 Finally, sports agents who are lawyers must abide by their
state bar rules of professional conduct. 17
As the Internet increases in popularity as a respected form of
communication, sports agents face many new hurdles in making
contracts with athletes over this new medium. One such question is
which law applies when a sports agent is contracting with a student-
athlete over the Internet. For example, if a sports agent is sitting in
his or her main office in New York City and the e-mail server is
located in San Francisco, what state has jurisdiction if a dispute oc-
curs? New York or California?
III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNET
A. Traditional Personal Jurisdiction
1. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Federal courts are guided by the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and Supreme Court precedent in establishing personal juris-
DEPAuL-LCAJ. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 194 (1997). See also Daniel M. Faber, The
Evolution of Techniques for Negotiation of Sports Employment Contracts in the Era of the
Agent, 10 U. MiAMI Err. & SPORTS L. REv. 165 (1993).
12. SeeJARvIs & COLEMAN, supra note 9, at 462 (noting that amount of com-
mission varies depending on sport and agent and is determined by sports agent's
contract with client).
13. See id. at 478-502.
14. See id. at 502. Each professional sports league has its own certification
requirements that an agent must fulfill before obtaining the ability to negotiate
contracts on behalf of his or her client with the teams in that particular sport. For
a further discussion of agent certification programs, see Gary P. Konn, Sports Agents
Representing Professional Athletes: Being Certified Means Never Having to Say You 'r Qual-
ified, 6 ENT. & SPORTS L. 1 (1988).
15. For a further discussion of the NCAA rules, see infra notes 160-76 and
accompanying text.
16. SeeJARvis & COLEMAN, supra note 9, at 502.
17. See id.
3
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diction.18 In certain cases, a federal court must examine the long-
arm statute of the state in which it resides to determine if personal
jurisdiction is proper.19 If a case does not meet the requirements of
the state long-arm statute, then the court cannot exercise personal
jurisdiction over the matter.20 If the case does fall within the state
long-arm statute, then the federal court must determine whether
exercising personal jurisdiction is proper under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 1
The Supreme Court of the United States distinguishes between
general and specific personal jurisdiction.22 General jurisdiction
occurs "when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to
the foreign [defendant's] activities in the forum."23 The defendant
must have had "continuous and systematic" contacts with the forum
state for a court to exercise general jurisdiction. 24 Specific jurisdic-
18. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1) (authorizing service upon individual in any
judicial district "pursuant to the law of the state in which the district court is lo-
cated, or in which service is effected, for the service of a summons upon the defen-
dant in an action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of the State").
Service of summons will establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant "who
would be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state
in which the district court is located . . . ." FED. R. Clv. P. 4(k) (1) (A).
19. See FED. R. CIv. P. 4(e)(1) (authorizing courts to exercise personal juris-
diction pursuant to state long-arm statute); Provident Nat'l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 819 F.2d 434, 436 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that state long-arm statutes
determine applicability of personal jurisdiction). Many state long-arm statutes ex-
tend personal jurisdiction to the limits of the United States Constitution. See, e.g.,
APi. CODE ANN. § 16-4-101(B) (Michie 1997) (extending personal jurisdiction to
limits of United States Constitution); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1999)
(same); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-209(c) (1999) (same); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5322(b) (West 1998) (same). A few states, however, do not extend personal ju-
risdiction to the limits of the Constitution. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302a (McKinney
1999) (limiting exercise of personal jurisdiction with four factors).
20. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (1) (allowing courts to utilize state long-arm
statutes in order to exercise personal jurisdiction).
21. See, e.g., Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 723 (E.D. Pa.
1999) (describing two-step analysis in which federal courts must engage when de-
ciding whether personal jurisdiction is proper); Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937
F. Supp. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997) (recognizing
that even if personal jurisdiction were proper under New York Long-Arm Statute it
must also comply with due process).
22. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-19
(1984) (using specific standards to determine whether case fell under specific or
general jurisdiction).
23. Id. at 414.
24. See id. at 415-16. In Helicopteros, the Court found that the defendant's con-
tacts with Texas were not "continuous and systematic" enough to justify general
jurisdiction. See id. at 416. The defendant had sent its Chief Executive Officer to
Texas for one negotiation session, accepted checks drawn on a Texas bank, bought
equipment in and sent pilots to Texas for training. See id. (describing defendant's
contacts with Texas). Plaintiffs generally have had difficulty proving that defend-
ants' forum contacts satisfied the systematic and continuous standard of general
[Vol. 8: p. 37
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tion occurs when the cause of action arises directly from or relates
to the nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum.
25
2. Supreme Court's Limitations Upon Personal Jurisdiction
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits
a state's power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant. 26 Grounded in the Due Process Clause, the Supreme
Court has ruled that personal jurisdiction is proper if a defendant
has "certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. "' 27 In deciding whether it can exercise
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, a court must
analyze: (1) whether the defendant has sufficient minimum con-
tacts with the forum; and (2) if sufficient minimum contacts exist,
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with "fair
play and substantial justice."28
a. Minimum Contacts With the Forum
To conclude that a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts
with the forum, a court must find that the defendant could "reason-
jurisdiction. See Surgical Laser Techs., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 281, 284
(E.D. Pa. 1996) (stating that Helicopteros illustrates difficulty of satisfying continu-
ous and systematic standard).
25. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (describing
specific jurisdiction); Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 (defining specific jurisdiction).
26. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (holding that states have
sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction over people within their territories but can-
not exercise these powers over people outside their territories); see also Helicopteros,
466 U.S. at 413-14 (noting purpose of Due Process Clause in personal jurisdiction
context); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978) ("The Due Process
Clause... operates as a limitation on the jurisdiction of state courts to enter judg-
ments affecting rights or interest[s] of nonresident defendants.").
27. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). In International Shoe, the Supreme Court af-
firmed the Supreme Court of Washington's ruling that personal jurisdiction was
proper. See id. at 320-22. The defendant employed eleven to thirteen salespeople
to sell shoes in Washington. See id. at 313-14. The salespeople showed samples,
took orders and transmitted these orders to the defendant's headquarters in Mis-
souri. See id. (detailing job duties of salespeople). The shoes were then shipped
into Washington from locations outside of Washington. See id. at 314. The state of
Washington sued the defendant to collect overdue contributions to a state unem-
ployment fund. See id. at 311-12. The Supreme Court found that the defendant
had "systematic and continuous" contacts with Washington. See id. at 320 (finding
defendant's contacts "were neither irregular nor casual"). Because the defendant
had exercised the privilege of conducting business within Washington, the defen-
dant was also bound by the obligations of acting in that state, namely making pay-
ments to the unemployment fund. See id. at 319-20. Therefore, the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over the defendant was proper. See id. at 321.
28. See id. at 319-20.
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ably anticipate being haled into court there."29 A defendant can
anticipate being haled into a forum state's court if it has "purpose-
fully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws." 30 The Supreme Court has determined purposeful availment
when a defendant entered into a contract and negotiations in the
forum state,31 sold magazines across the nation including the forum
state,3 2 and maintained a sales force in the forum state.3 3 It re-
mains unclear, however, whether entering a product into the
stream of commerce subjects a defendant to personal jurisdiction. 34
29. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); see
also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-91 (1984) (holding that California could
exercise personal jurisdiction over National Enquirer editor and writer because:
(1) defendants could have anticipated being haled into court in California; (2)
defendants wrote article causing harm in forum; and (3) newspaper had largest
circulation in that forum); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781
(1984) (deciding that personal jurisdiction in New Hampshire was proper because
defendant had "continuously and deliberately exploited" forum market and could
have reasonably anticipated being haled into that court for libel). But see Kulko,
436 U.S. at 97-98 (refusing to find personal jurisdiction over nonresident father
who had allowed his children to move to California because father could not have
anticipated being haled into court in California).
The "reasonably anticipate being haled into court" standard is stronger than
mere foreseeability of injury. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474. World-Wide Volk-
swagen established that foreseeability alone is not enough for jurisdiction. See
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295-99 (rejecting plaintiffs argument that per-
sonal jurisdiction was proper in Oklahoma because it was foreseeable that car
could cause injury there). In that case, it was argued that it was foreseeable that
the defendants' car could end up in a car accident in Oklahoma. See id. at 295.
The Court also discussed Kulko, in which it was also found foreseeable that a di-
vorced wife would live in California and that her daughter would move there to be
with her. See id. at 296. The Supreme Court, however, refused to find that Califor-
nia had personal jurisdiction over the ex-husband who lived in New York. See id.
(discussing Kulko's facts and holding). In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court refused
to exercise personal jurisdiction over the retailer and wholesaler because they had
not purposefully availed themselves of conducting business in Oklahoma; it was a
"fortuitous circumstance" that the car was involved in an accident in Oklahoma.
See id. at 295-99.
30. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). As the Court pointed out in Burger King,
requiring purposeful availment "ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a
jurisdiction solely as a result of 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated,' contacts."
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (quoting Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774).
31. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478-87 (holding that defendant was subject to
personal jurisdiction in Florida because he had negotiated and entered into con-
tract containing Florida choice-of-law provision).
32. See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 73-74 (holding that defendant's "regular circulation
of magazines in the forum State [was] sufficient to support an assertion ofjurisdic-
tion in a libel action based on the contents of the magazine").
33. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320-22 (concluding that defendant's business ac-
tivities in Washington were sufficient for personal jurisdiction).
34. SeeAsahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108-13 (1987)
(plurality opinion) (addressing stream of commerce theory). In Asahi, the peti-
[Vol. 8: p. 37
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In cases involving tortious conduct, the Supreme Court created
an "effects test" to determine whether the forum state can exercise
personal jurisdiction.3 5 Under the effects test, courts have exer-
cised personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants when the
forum state was the "focal point" of the plaintiffs injury.3 6 The Su-
preme Court held in Calder v. Jones3 7 that California could exercise
personal jurisdiction over the defendants because "their inten-
tional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at
California."38
tioner was a Japanese manufacturer of tire valve assemblies. See id. at 106. These
valve assemblies were sold to a number of companies including Cheng Shin, a
Taiwanese corporation, which used these assemblies in tires shipped all over the
world. See id. After Cheng Shin was sued in California for damages relating to the
blowout of a tire, Cheng Shin attempted to indemnify Asahi. See id. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court found that personal jurisdiction over Asahi was proper because
the company was aware that its valve assemblies could end up in California. See id.
at 108. The United States Supreme Court reversed, however, finding that Califor-
nia could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Asahi. See id.
Although all of the justices agreed that the exercise of personal jurisdiction in
California was improper under the reasonableness prong of the International Shoe
test, the Justices were split on whether Asahi had sufficient minimum contacts with
California. See id. at 105 (giving breakdown ofJustices' votes). Justice O'Connor,
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Justice Powell andjustice Scalia found that Asahi's "place-
ment of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, [was] not an act of
the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State." Id. at 112. Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, however, concluded that Asahi had pur-
posefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in California. See id.
at 116-21. Finally, Justice Stevens believed it was unnecessary to consider the
stream of commerce theory because the exercise of personal jurisdiction was un-
reasonable. See id. at 121-22 (stating that minimum contacts analysis was unneces-
sary, and even if it were required, there were probably enough contacts to
constitute purposeful availment).
35. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-91 (1984) (discussing effects test).
In Calder, the National Enquirer published an allegedly libelous story about enter-
tainer ShirleyJones. See id. at 784. The plaintiff sued the Florida-based publication
in California. See id. The petitioners, an editor (who resided in Florida and trav-
eled frequently to California) and writer (who resided in Florida and prior to the
lawsuit had only visited California twice), moved to have the suit dismissed for lack
of personal jurisdiction. See id. at 784-86. The Supreme Court, however, held that
California could exercise personal jurisdiction over both defendants. See id. at 788-
89. Because the plaintiffs career was based in California, she suffered most of the
damage from the defendants' story there. See id. at 789 (concluding California was
"focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered"). Furthermore, the de-
fendants used California sources to research and write the story. See id. Califor-
nia's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants was proper because
"their intentional conduct in Florida [was] calculated to cause injury.., in Califor-
nia." Id. at 791. Because the defendants knew that the plaintiff would suffer most
of the harm in California, they could reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there. See id. at 789-90.
36. See id. at 789. The defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction in Cal-
ifornia because the plaintiff felt the effects of their conduct there. See id.
37. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
38. Id. at 789.
7
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b. Fair Play and Substantial Justice
A court must determine whether the exercise of personal juris-
diction would be reasonable even if a defendant has sufficient mini-
mum contacts with the forum.39 In deciding whether the exercise
of personal jurisdiction was reasonable, courts have considered: (1)
the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum state's interest in pro-
tecting its residents; (3) the plaintiffs interest in obtaining conve-
nient relief; (4) the "interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining
the most efficient resolution of controversies;" and (5) the state's
interest "in furthering substantive social policies."40 If these factors
are particularly strong, lesser minimum contacts may support per-
sonal jurisdiction.41
B. Establishing Electronic Personal Jurisdiction
To understand the growing legal issues surrounding electronic
personal jurisdiction and how they affect contracting on the In-
ternet, it is important to have a "clear understanding of the expo-
nentially growing, worldwide medium that is the Internet."42 The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has de-
scribed the Internet as "a global network that links smaller networks
of computers."43 The Internet is a "network of networks," without
39. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (stating that
personal jurisdiction cannot violate fair play and substantial justice).
40. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); see
also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (plurality
opinion) (setting forth factors to consider in deciding whether exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction would be reasonable); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 476-77 (1985) (discussing reasonableness factors for personal jurisdiction).
41. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (noting that strong factors in favor of
personal jurisdiction may compensate for lesser minimum contacts).
42. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(noting need to have knowledge of creation of Internet before tackling new First
Amendment and due process jurisprudence).
43. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (describ-
ing relationship between Internet and Internet browsers). The Eastern District of
Pennsylvania characterized the Internet as "a giant network which interconnects
innumerable smaller groups of linked computer networks." See Reno, 929 F. Supp.
at 830. The Internet is comprised of computers or computer networks that are
owned by governmental and public institutions or non-profit or privately owned
organizations. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 831. As a result of the ensuing network, the
Internet is a "decentralized, global medium of communications - or 'cyberspace' -
that links people, institutions, corporations, and governments around the world."
Id. The Internet, originating in 1969 as an experimental project of the Advanced
Research Project Agency ("ARPA"), was initially called ARPANET. See id. The net-
work connected computers owned by the military, defense contractors and univer-
sity laboratories that were conducting defense related research. See id. The
ARPANET later allowed researchers across the country to access and use the pow-
[Vol. 8: p. 37
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any main focal point or centralized location.44 Users can communi-
cate and distribute information over the Internet in a variety of
ways including by email, Usenet discussion groups, real time chat
(Internet Relay Chat) and the World Wide Web. 45
erful supercomputers located in a few important universities and laboratories. See
id.
From its inception, the Internet was "designed to be a decentralized, self-
maintaining series of redundant links between computers and computer networks,
capable of rapidly transmitting communications without direct human involve-
ment or control, and with the automatic ability to re-route communications if one
or more individual links were damaged or otherwise unavailable." Id. Even if a
major catastrophe damaged a portion of the network, this redundant system of
linked computers would allow vital research and communications to continue. See
id. A message sent over the network could travel over a number of different routes
to its destination; thus, a communication is transmitted through a number of inter-
connected computers. See id. at 831-32. Communications that travel over the In-
ternet are even transmitted in broken pieces. See id. at 832. The Internet uses
"packet switching," a communication protocol that sub-divides a message into
smaller "packets" that are then sent independently to the receiving computer,
which reassembles the message once all of the "packets" are received. See id.
While ARPANET was evolving, similar networks such as BITNET, CSNET,
FIDONET and USENET were developed to link businesses, research facilities, indi-
viduals and universities. See id. Over time, each of these networks linked together
connecting computers and computer networks eventually creating the series of
networked computers referred to as the Internet. See id.
44. See id. at 830-32 (discussing decentralized development of Internet).
45. See id. at 834-38 (discussing methods of communicating on Internet).
Through e-mail, a person can communicate directly with one or several people
with Internet access. See id. at 834.
Listservs are automatic mailing list services organized around particular topics
such as opera, children's literature or German. See id. at 834. Tojoin a particular
listserv, a person must subscribe to that listserv by e-mail. See id. After subscribing
to the listserv, a person will receive e-mails from other members of that listserv. See
id. To respond to an e-mail, the recipient sends an e-mail to the listserv, which is
then automatically distributed to the other members. See id. (Usually a computer
does this but some listservs are moderated by a person who will read and then only
e-mail select messages). See id. Listservs that are run by computers are "open" and
can be joined automatically while "closed" listservs are run by human moderators
who may limit the number of subscribers. See id.
Like listservs, Usenet groups are organized around topics (such asjob oppor-
tunities in New Jersey, Babylon 5 or Sikhism). See id. at 834-35. Today there are
over forty-five thousand Usenet groups generating half a million postings a day.
See Katie Hafner, Old Newsgroups Marketed in New Packages, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
1999, at GI (giving Usenet statistics). As of 1995, approximately twenty people
used Usenet. See id. (stating last known number of Usenet participants). To access
a particular Usenet group, a person may subscribe to that group and read other
subscriber's posts. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 834-35 (providing information on join-
ing Usenet group). On moderated newsgroups, a moderator decides which
messages to post and reviews all messages. See id. at 835. On unmoderated groups,
messages are automatically forwarded to all Usenet servers that furnish access to
the group. See id. Unlike listserv messages, Usenet posts are not distributed to a
person by e-mail. See id. Instead Usenet posts are disseminated to servers that
temporarily store these messages and periodically purge them. See id. So if a per-
son wishes to respond to someone else's post or post his or her own messages, he
or she will post a message that is either sent to a moderator on a closed group or
9
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1. Commercial Activity Over the Internet
Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.46 established the
general framework for analyzing personal jurisdiction on the In-
ternet. Generally, the establishment of personal jurisdiction is "di-
rectly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial
sent to other servers on an open group. See id. Usenet groups are among the most
open and diverse methods of interaction on the Internet. See Hafner, supra, at GI
(calling Usenet "particularly untamed, free-flowing part of the Internet").
Internet users may also "chat" online. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 835 (provid-
ing overview of Internet chat). Through Internet Relay Chat ("IRC"), a person
may communicate with one or more people who are online at the same time. See
id. The user will type a message on his or her computer, and this message will be
transmitted and displayed on the recipient's computer. See id. Internet Service
Providers ("ISPs") such as America Online, CompuServe and Earthlink have their
own "chat" systems. See id.
People can also view and obtain information such as text, pictures, movies and
music from other computers. See id. at 835-36. Previously, people used telnet or
file transfer protocol ("ftp") to access information on other computers. See id. at
835. Today, however, most people use the World Wide Web. See id. The Eastern
District of Pennsylvania defined the World Wide Web as "a series of documents
stored in different computers all over the Internet." Id. at 836. World Wide Web
pages are created with hypertext markup language ("HTML") and then displayed
on individual computers through browsers such as Netscape Communicator and
Microsoft Internet Explorer using hypertext transfer protocol ("http"). See id. at
836. Web pages can contain music, animation and text. See id. Web pages also
contain hypertext links, which viewers can click to visit other Web sites or
download information. See id. at 836-37. Although individual computers may be
incompatible, they can exchange information through the World Wide Web. See
id. at 838. The World Wide Web has become increasingly popular because it is so
easy to use. See id. at 837. Furthermore, HTML is so simple and Web pages are so
inexpensive that it is fairly easy for people unfamiliar with technology to publish
their own Web pages. See id.
46. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). In Zippo, the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania found that the defendant was sub-
ject to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania because it had sold approximately
three thousand passwords to Pennsylvania residents and entered into seven con-
tracts with Pennsylvania ISPs. See id. at 1125-26 (analyzing defendant's contacts
within forum). The Zippo court described the following framework for examining
personal jurisdiction on the Internet:
This sliding scale is consistent with well developed personal jurisdiction
principles. At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant
clearly does business over the Internet. If the defendant enters into con-
tracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and
repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet, personal juris-
diction is proper. At the opposite end are situations where a defendant
has simply posted information on an Internet Web site which is accessible
to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web site that does little more
than make information available to those who are interested in it is not
grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. The middle ground is
occupied by interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information
with the host computer. In these cases, the exercise ofjurisdiction is de-
termined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature
of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site.
Id. at 1124 (citations omitted).
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activity that an entity conducts over the Internet."47 If a company
has clearly conducted business over the Internet with the forum
state, then the forum state's exercise of personal jurisdiction is
proper.48 CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson49 is the leading example of a
case where the nonresident defendant's business contacts with the
forum state supported the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 50
Courts generally have refused to exercise personal jurisdiction
over a defendant when the only contact with the forum state was
the posting of a passive Web site.51 A passive Web site merely pro-
47. Id.
48. For a further discussion of a forum state's exercise of personal jurisdiction
based upon a defendant's business contacts, see infra notes 49-77 and accompany-
ing text.
49. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
50. See id. In CompuServe, the defendant, a Texas resident, entered into a con-
tract with the plaintiff, an Ohio corporation, to provide software. See id. at 1259-60.
The contract stated that Ohio law would govern. See id. at 1260. The defendant
transmitted thirty-two software files to the plaintiff, which then made these files
available for downloading to subscribers. See id. at 1261. According to the defen-
dant, he sold about $650 worth of software to Ohio residents. See id.
After the defendant complained that the plaintiff was infringing on his
software trademarks, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio finding that it had not in-
fringed on any of the defendant's trademarks. See id. at 1261. The district court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See id.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the
lower court's decision, holding that the defendant was subject to personal jurisdic-
tion in Ohio. See id. at 1268-69. The Sixth Circuit found that the defendant had
purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in Ohio by
entering into a contract with an Ohio-based company, transmitting software to
Ohio over a three year period and contacting the plaintiff by phone, mail and e-
mail when he believed it was infringing on his software's trademark. See id. at 1264-
67.
51. See, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419-20 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that passive Web site did not show purposeful availment); Edberg
v. Neogen Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 104, 115 (D. Conn. 1998) (holding that mainte-
nance of Web site alone did not support personal jurisdiction in Connecticut);
CFOs 2 Go, Inc. v. CFO 2 Go, Inc., No. CJV.A.97-4676 SL, 1998 WL 320821, at *3
(N.D. Cal. June 5, 1998) (finding that incomplete Web page was not enough for
personal jurisdiction); Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d
1097, 1104-05 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (deciding that defendant's Web site did not justify
personal jurisdiction in Illinois); Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327, 333-34
(D.N.J. 1997) (finding that defendant's Web advertising did not support personal
jurisdiction); Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356, 1365 (W.D.
Ark. 1997) (concluding that Web site advertisement was insufficient contact with
forum for personal jurisdiction); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 CIV.A. 3620,
1997 WL 97097, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (comparing defendant's Web site
"to an advertisement in a national publication" that did not support personal juris-
diction); Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (noting that maintenance of passive Web site
did not expose nonresident defendant to personal jurisdiction); McDonough v.
Fallon McElligott, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1826, 1828-29 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (recognizing
that Web site alone was not enough to establish personal jurisdiction); Michel v.
Rocket Eng'g Corp. No. 2-00-112-CV, 2001 WL 125926, at *12 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb.
11
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vides information to the viewer. 52 The United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v.
King53 held that a passive Web site did not justify the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.54 A few
courts, on the other hand, have found that the creation of a passive
Web site did justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 55
15, 2001) (finding that defendant's Web page was passive); Ragonese v. Rosenfeld,
722 A.2d 991, 995-96 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998) (characterizing defendant's
Web page as passive and therefore not supporting personal jurisdiction).
52. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (defining passive Web site).
53. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
54. See id. at 299-300 (holding that passive Web site did not support personal
jurisdiction). In Bensusan, the plaintiff, who owned a New York City jazz club
called "The Blue Note," sued the defendant, an owner of a Missouri club also
called "The Blue Note," for infringing on his rights to the trademark "The Blue
Note." See id. at 297. The defendant had promoted his small club on a Web page.
See id. (describing defendant's Internet activities). The Web page provided infor-
mation on the defendant's club, addresses of locations to buy tickets and a phone
number to call and charge tickets. See id. To pick up the tickets, people had to go
to the club in Columbia, Missouri. See id. The court refused to exercise jurisdic-
tion over the defendant under the New York Long-Arm Statute and due process
because the defendant had "done nothing to purposefully avail himself of the ben-
efits of New York." Id. at 301. The court compared the defendant's creation of the
Web site to placing a product in the stream of commerce, which was not enough
for personal jurisdiction without something more. See id. Even though it was fore-
seeable that a New York resident might have viewed this Web site and become
confused as to the relationship between the two clubs, this was not enough for
personal jurisdiction. See id. (dismissing foreseeability as grounds for personal
jurisdiction).
One commentator has pointed out that Bensusan offers dubious precedent
because it was decided under the New York Long-Arm Statute, which is more re-
strictive than due process. See Todd D. Leitstein, A Solution for Personal Jurisdiction
on the Internet, 59 LA. L. REv. 565, 577-78 (1999) (finding use of Bensusan for passive
analysis "problematic"). Therefore, courts may distinguish Internet cases based on
less restrictive state long-arm statutes from Bensusan. See id. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania also recognized that Ben-
susan offered limited precedent. See Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d
717, 725 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (noting that Bensusan and Hearst decisions were only
"instructive" because they were decided under New York Long-Arm Statute).
55. See Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 164-65 (D.
Conn. 1996) (holding that Web site with toll-free number subjected defendant to
personal jurisdiction in Connecticut). In this case, the district court focused on
the worldwide availability of the defendant's Web site. See id. Based on the defen-
dant's Web site, the court concluded that the defendant had attempted to adver-
tise in every state including Connecticut. See id. at 165 (recognizing that Internet is
"designed to communicate with people and their businesses in every state"). The
court concluded that the defendant had purposefully availed itself of acting in
Connecticut because its Web site was available to the entire nation, including
10,000 Connecticut residents. See id. at 165.
Other courts have followed this reasoning. See Telco Communications v. An
Apple A Day, 977 F. Supp. 404, 406-07 (E.D. Va. 1997) (following Inset to hold that
Web site advertisement subjected defendant to personal jurisdiction in Virginia);
Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (D.D.C. 1996) (suggesting that
Web site with toll-free number that was always available to forum residents might
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In cases where the level of Web site activity fell between a to-
tally passive site and an active commercial site, courts have ex-
amined the amount of commercial interactivity to determine
whether personal jurisdiction was proper.5 6 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Missouri in Maritz, Inc. v.
Cybergold, Inc.57 held that personal jurisdiction was proper since the
defendant actively solicited Internet users from all over the world
including the forum state, Missouri. 58 Internet users interacted
be enough to support exercise of personal jurisdiction in forum); State v. Granite
Gate Resorts, Inc., No. CIV.A.6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at *11 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
Dec. 11, 1996) (concluding that defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in
Minnesota because it had purposefully availed itself of conducting business there
when it "place[d] its ad on the Internet 24 [sic] hours, seven days a week, 365 days
a year"), affd, 576 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1998). But see Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Comput-
ing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34, 46 (D. Mass. 1997) (expressing reservations about hold-
ings in Inset, Heroes and Mantz).
56. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (setting forth personal jurisdiction analysis
for "interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information with the host
computer").
57. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
58. See id. at 1334 (finding that defendant had purposefully availed itself of
privilege of acting in Missouri and could have anticipated being haled into court
there). The defendant, based in California, had created a Web site promoting its
services. See id. at 1330. Users could sign up on the defendant's mailing list and
receive an electronic mailbox. See id. In signing up for a mailbox, users would
specify particular areas of interest, and the defendant would then send the users
advertisements that matched these interests. See id. The defendant planned to
charge advertisers for access to these users, but the service was not operational yet.
See id. According to the court, Missouri residents accessed this service 311 times
although at least 180 times were by the plaintiff. See id. Because the defendant
had transmitted its Web site promotion approximately 131 times to Missouri re-
sidents, the court found that the defendant had purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of acting in Missouri. See id. at 1333 (finding that Missouri could exercise
personal jurisdiction over defendant). One court, however, has characterized
Maritz as a passive Web site case rather than an interactive site case. See Hasbro, 994
F. Supp. at 46 ("I have reservations about decisions such as Inset, Heroes, and Maritz
which found that the existence of a Web site alone is enough to allow jurisdiction
in any state."). Thompson v. Handa-Loez, Inc. might be a better example of an
interactive Web site that supported the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 998 F.
Supp. 338 (W.D. Tex. 1998). In that case, the plaintiff sued the defendant in
Texas for breach of contract, fraud and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act. See Thompson, 998 F. Supp. at 741. The defendant ran an Internet
casino from California. See id. The plaintiff claimed that he had won approxi-
mately $193,728.40 through the defendant's Web site, and the defendant refused
to pay this money. See id. The defendant attempted to escape personal jurisdic-
tion in Texas by claiming it did not have sufficient minimum contacts with the
forum. See id. at 743. Because the defendant's Web site had interacted continu-
ously with the plaintiff in Texas, the court held that the exercise of personal juris-
diction was proper. See id. at 744 (noting that defendant "continuously interacted
with the casino players, entering into contracts with them as they played the vari-
ous games"). The defendant interacted with the plaintiff even more than the de-
fendants in Maritz and Inset. See id. (recognizing that defendant did more on
Internet than merely maintain Web site with toll-free phone number).
13
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with the defendant's Web site by affirmatively signing onto the de-
fendant's mailing list.59
2. Additional Approaches to Analyzing Personal Jurisdiction on the
Internet
A number of courts have analyzed personal jurisdiction on the
Internet under the stream of commerce theory.60 In Hasbro, Inc. v.
Clue Computing, Inc.,61 the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts stated that posting information on a Web site
was "most analogous to . . . placing a product in the 'stream of
commerce."' 62 According to the court, courts may use the stream
of commerce theory in order to decide whether a Web site targeted
the forum state.63 The district court ultimately concluded that the
defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum because
the defendant had directed its Internet advertising to the entire na-
tion, including the forum state, and had conducted business with a
forum company.64
Courts have also considered defendants' non-Internet, as well
as Internet, contacts in deciding whether personal jurisdiction was
proper. In Blumenthal v. Drudge,65 for example, the district court
found that personal jurisdiction was proper in the District of Co-
lumbia based upon the defendant's Internet, mail and phone con-
tacts with forum residents. 66 The defendant's Internet activities
consisted of a Web site containing District of Columbia gossip, a
contract with America Online to publish this gossip and contribu-
59. See Mafitz, 947 F. Supp. at 1329-34 (holding that defendant's interactive
Web site supported personal jurisdiction).
60. See, e.g., Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1097,
1104 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (using stream of commerce analysis to examine defendant's
Internet activities); Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 42-45 (analyzing defendant's contacts
under stream of commerce theory); Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F.
Supp. 1356, 1362-64 (W.D. Ark. 1997) (referring to stream of commerce theory);
Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (comparing
creation of Web site to placement of product in stream of commerce, which does
not support personal jurisdiction without some additional act).
61. 994 F. Supp. 34 (D. Mass. 1997).
62. Id. at 42. For more specific information regarding the Asahi analysis, see
supra note 34 and accompanying text.
63. See Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 42 (recommending use of Asahi analysis).
64. See id. at 44-45 (finding that defendant's Internet activity satisfied pur-
poseful availment requirement of due process).
65. 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
66. See id. at 56 (basing personal jurisdiction on defendant's activities on and
off Internet). In this case, the defendant was a gossip columnist who resided in
California. See id. at 46-47. The defendant wrote allegedly defamatory statements
about the plaintiffs that appeared on America Online as well as the defendant's
own Web site. See id. at 47-48.
[Vol. 8: p. 37
14
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol8/iss1/2
2001] ATHLETES AND AGENTS CONFRONT A NEW HURDLE 51
fions from at least fifteen forum residents who responded to his
Web site.67 In addition to these Internet activities, the defendant
had also visited the District of Columbia twice (once for an inter-
view with C-SPAN), and mailed and phoned forum residents to ob-
tain information. 68 The court held that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant was proper based upon all of these
activities. 69
In cases involving tortious conduct, courts have invoked the
Calder effects test to determine whether a defendant's Internet con-
tacts supported personal jurisdiction. 70 In Panavision International
v. Toeppen,71 for example, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant was subject to personal
jurisdiction in California under the effects test.72 Using the effects
test, the court concluded that the defendant had purposely
targeted his tortious behavior at California, and he knew that the
plaintiff would suffer the most injury there. 73 Therefore, California
could exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
67. See id. at 56-57 (describing defendant's Internet contacts).
68. See id. at 56 (listing defendant's non-Internet contacts with D.C.).
69. See id. at 56-58 (finding that defendant had sufficient minimum contacts
with D.C. for exercise of personal jurisdiction).
70. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (9th Cir.
1998) (utilizing effects test because case was "akin to a tort case"); Barrett v. Cata-
combs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 729-31 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (finding that effects test
did not support exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant accused of defa-
mation); Edias Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. Basis Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 420-21 (D.
Ariz. 1996) (using effects test to find that defendant was subject to personal juris-
diction in Arizona for defamatory comments directed to forum); Blakey v. Conti-
nental Airlines, Inc., 730 A.2d 854, 863 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (referring
to effects test that did not support exercise of personal jurisdiction over defend-
ants). But see Howard B. Stravitz, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Something More is
Required on the Electronic Stream of Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REv. 925, 936-37 (1998) (ar-
guing that Edias misapplied effects test because defendant suffered harm in Eu-
rope and not Arizona).
71. 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
72. See id. at 1321-22 (exercising personal jurisdiction over nonresident defen-
dant under effects test). In this case, the plaintiff, Panavision, accused the defen-
dant, Dennis Toeppen, of trademark dilution. See id. at 1318. The defendant
registered and used the plaintiff's trademarks as domain names. See id. at 1318-19.
After the plaintiff told the defendant to stop using these trademarks, the defen-
dant offered to sell the domain names back to the plaintiff. See id. at 1319. In
addition, the defendant had engaged previously in "cybersquatting." See id. (not-
ing that defendant had registered over 100 marks as domain names and attempted
to sell at least two).
73. See id. at 1321-22 (using effects test to subject nonresident defendant to
personal jurisdiction in California). The defendant engaged in tortious-like con-
duct by intentionally registering the plaintiffs trademarks as domain names and
then attempting to extort money from the plaintifffor these marks. See id. at 1321.
The plaintiffs principal place of business was California, and the defendant knew
that the plaintiff would suffer the most harm there. See id. Therefore, under the
15
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In order to determine what type of contact sports agents make
with student-athletes, it will be important to determine what type of
activity is occurring in the forum state. As already discussed, the
sports agent's contact with an athlete will depend on whether the
agent clearly conducted business over the Internet within the fo-
rum state, 74 whether the activity was a simple posting of a passive
Web site trying to recruit athletes, 75 whether the activity falls be-
tween the notions of a totally passive Web site or an active commer-
cial site,76 or whether the agent's contact falls under the stream of
commerce theory.77 While sports agents need to keep how much
activity they plan in a forum state, they also need to understand the
intricacies of contracting over the Internet.
IV. MAKING CoNTRAcrs ON THE WEB
A. Traditional Contracts
The Second Restatement of Contracts defines a contract as a
promise, or a set of promises, that the law will enforce or at least
recognize in some way.78 To be recognized by the law, the parties
must go through a bargaining process involving the traditional of-
fer and acceptance. 79 Another requirement for forming an en-
forceable contract is that both parties making the contract must
intend to form a contract. 80
According to the Restatement, there is no mutual agreement
to a contract if the parties attach materially different meanings to
their manifestations and if neither party knows or has reason to
know of the meaning attached by the other party.81 The parties
may not realize that they attached materially different meanings un-
til one or both of the parties attempt to perform their end of the
effects test the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of acting in
California. See id. at 1322 (rejecting defendant's argument that he had no contacts
with California).
74. For a discussion of businesses clearly conducting activity over the Internet
within the forum state, see supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
75. For a discussion of passive Web site activity, see supra notes 51-55 and
accompanying text.
76. For a discussion of activity that falls between the classifications of a totally
passive Web site or an active commercial site, see supra notes 56-59 and accompa-
nying text.
77. For a discussion of a stream of commerce analysis, see supra notes 60-64
and accompanying text.
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrS § 1 (1973).
79. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACrS viii
(1995).
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 17 (1973).
81. See id. § 20(1).
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contract. At such a point, unless one of the parties knew or had
reason to know of the meaning attached by the other party, the
court will determine that no contract was made.8 2
An offer is defined as the manifestation of the willingness to
enter into a bargain.8 3 The offer must be made in a way as tojustify
another person in understanding that his or her agreement to the
bargain will form a contract.8 4 The offeror can determine what
kind of response is required by the other party to constitute accept-
ance.8 5 The offeror, for example, may require that the acceptance
be made orally with affirmative words or simply by performance by
the accepting party.8 6
The Restatement requires that both parties mutually assent to
a contract.8 7 If one party negotiated the contract in jest or as a
joke, it will be enforceable unless one party reasonably could tell
that the other party did not intend to make a contract.88 In the
case of Lucy v. Zehmer,89 the Supreme Court of Virginia found that
the actions on the part of Zehmer could not reasonably be inter-
preted as ajoke.90 Zehmer believed that an offer made by Lucy was
82. See id. The court will determine that no contract was made because the
parties did not intend to bind themselves to the contract that was actually formed.
See id. Because there was no actual agreement to the terms, there was no mutual
accepted agreement because the parties believed they were contracting for two
different things. See id.
83. See id. § 24.
84. See id. An offer can be made in any form that shows that the person mak-
ing the offer is willing to enter into a contract with anyone who will agree to the
terms. See id.
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 30(1).
86. See id. If the form of acceptance is not indicated in any form by the offer-
ing party, then acceptance may come by any manner and medium that is reasona-
ble given the existing circumstances. See id. § 52. The language of the
Restatement would seem to indicate that acceptance may be made via the Web.
However, it is important to keep in mind that the drafting of the Second Restate-
ment of Contracts preceded the Internet and the Web. Compare RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, with ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 833 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (stating that first public community Internet access began in 1986). Cer-
tainly, at the time of its drafting, the legislatures never could have imagined the
number of people attempting to contract through the Web. For a further discus-
sion concerning offer and acceptance over the Internet, see infra notes 104-16 and
accompanying text.
87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1).
88. See Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522 (Va. 1954).
89. 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954).
90. See id. at 521 (listing elements of transaction as evidence of sale's serious
nature). The contract was written signed by Zehmer on the back of a restaurant
receipt. See id. at 517. Lucy offered to buy Zehmer's farm for $50,000 dollars. See
id. Zehmer thought that the offer was made as a joke and wrote out a note stating,
"We hereby agree to sell to W.O. Lucy the Ferguson Farm complete for $50,000,
title satisfactory to buyer." Id. at 517-18. This was then signed by Zehmer and his
17
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a joke.9 1 Going along with the joke, Zehmer wrote out a contract
stating that he would sell his farm to Lucy for $50,000.92 This con-
tract was signed by both Zehmer and his wife. 93
Lucy believed that the contract was valid and binding, and the
next day he began financing the deal.94 At trial Zehmer testified
that he was drunk at the time of the negotiations and that both
parties were just bluffing. 95 The court stated, "We must look to the
outward expressions of a person as manifesting his intention rather
than to his secret and unexpressed intention. 'The law imputes to a
person an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of
his words and acts. "96
The court then looked at the outward manifestations made by
Zehmer to determine whether a reasonable person would be able
to tell that he was joking.9 7 The court found convincing evidence
to contradict Zehmer's testimony that he was joking and too drunk
to make a contract.98 Also, there was evidence that Zehmer wrote
two agreements. 99
wife. See id. at 517. Zehmer intended for this to be a joke and not a serious con-
tract. See id. at 518. Zehmer left the receipt at the restaurant, but Lucy picked it
up and kept it. See id.
91. See id. (noting that offer was made at Zehmer's restaurant).
92. See id. at 517 (noting that Zehmer had turned down past offers for farm
made by Lucy).
93. See id. (noting that Lucy testified that Mrs. Zehmer signed contract at her
husband's request).
94. See Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 521. Lucy made an arrangement with his brother for
half the money, and he hired an attorney to examine the title of the land. See id.
95. See id. at 520. Zehmer's argument was that both parties knew that the
negotiations were a joke, and the contract was written as part of the joke. See id.
Zehmer stated that he never intended to sell the farm. See id. at 518.
96. Id. at 521 (quoting First Nat. Exchange Bank of Roanoke v. Roanoke Oil
Co., 192 S.E. 764, 770 (Va. 1938)). The person's actions and words are judged by a
reasonable person standard to determine if there was an intention to form a con-
tract. See Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 522. It is immaterial what the real but unexpressed
intent the person has. See id.
97. See id. at 521-22 (noting that defendant's testimony showed that nothing
was said of contract being made in jest until Lucy offered five dollars to seal deal).
98. See id. at 520-21. Zehmer's wife suggested that Zehmer drive Lucy home.
See id. at 520. This, of course, suggests that Zehmer's wife did not believe that
Zehmer was too drunk to drive home.
99. See Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 520-21. The first agreement was only in Zehmer's
name and omitted his wife's name. See id. at 521. The second contract was written
in both of their names. See id. This change was made at Lucy's request. See id. By
making the change, it showed that Zehmer had time to think about the contract
and realize what was occurring. Additionally, it indicated that Lucy was serious
about his offer. The change was made to ensure that the contract would be en-
forceable against both Zehmer and his wife. Lucy wanted to make sure that he
bought the farm and that the contract was full and complete.
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Furthermore, there was evidence that the parties discussed the
written agreement for a long period of time before it was signed.100
The act of discussing the agreement for a long period shows that
the party is considering seriously the offer. Finally, the court
looked to the fact that once Lucy took the agreement, Zehmer
never asked to have the paper back.'0 1 The court concluded that
Zehmer's outward manifestations could have been interpreted as a
serious intent to form a contract by the reasonable person.10 2 Be-
cause the court made this determination, the contract was found to
be valid and enforceable against Zehmer.10 3 As this case indicates,
a person's outward manifestations are very important when it
comes to determining the intent of the parties.
B. Problems with Contracting on the Web
It has been well established that Internet sales and transactions
have boomed in the past several years. 104 In July 1997, the United
States Government published a report that stated that people
should be able to make business contracts over the Web under
whatever terms they can agree upon.10 5 In other words, "[B]uyers
and sellers could voluntarily agree to form a contract subject to this
uniform legal framework, just as parties currently choose the body
of law that will be used to interpret their contract."1 0 6 Contracting
on the Web differs from traditional contracting in several ways.
First, there is an absence of face-to-face negotiation over the
Web. 107 The only way in which negotiations may occur over the
100. See id. The negotiation took over forty minutes. See id.
101. See id. Lucy's taking possession of the paper with no request or sugges-
tion by Zehmer that it be returned was evidence that the contract was a serious
business transaction rather than a joke as the Zehmers contended. See id.
102. See id. (concluding that sale was serious and made in good faith).
103. See id. at 522 (reversing lower court's decision and remanding case in
order to require defendants' performance of contract).
104. See Scott S. Kokka, Property Rights on an Intranet, 3J. TECH L. & POL'Y 3, 17
(1998). In the United States, the current estimate is that electronic commerce will
be greater than $327 billion by the year 2002. See id. n.47.
105. See Walter A. Effross, The Legal Architecture of Virtual Stores: World Wide Web
Sites and the Uniform Commercial Code, 34 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 1263, 1273-74 (1997).
106. Id. at 1274-75 (quoting Interagency Working Group on Electronic Commerce, A
Framework for Global Electronic Commerce 2 (1997), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/Commerce/about.html).
107. See Effross, supra note 105, at 1281. Contracting over the Web is similar
to a store putting up an advertisement in the hope that a prospective buyer will
enter the store. See id. at 1281-83. A consumer would surf the Internet and come
to a Web site to browse merchandise or to make a purchase - this is much like a
person going shopping at a local store or mall. See id.
19
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Internet is via e-mail between the parties.'0 8 The problem with ne-
gotiating via e-mail or over the Internet in another format is that
the parties are unable to read the opposing parties' body language
or hear any changes in tone of voice.' 0 9 Being unaware of these
attributes is a major difference between contracting in the tradi-
tional manner than over a computer. It is much more difficult to
determine a person's outward manifestations over a computer than
it is in person. This could pose a problem if one party claims that
he or she did not intend to form a contract or that the contract was
made as a joke, and he or she was not serious about it. Addition-
ally, it is very easy for one party to misunderstand or misinterpret
the other party over the Internet." 0 Because the communications
transpire through a computer, these misunderstandings may go
unnoticed.' 1
Another problem that is unique to contracting over the In-
ternet is that ordinary contracting law binds parties by a common
usage of words in their locality." 2 The problem that presents itself
on the Web is that parties may be negotiating or completing a trans-
action from different parts of the country or the world. Different
usage of a term in different localities could affect drastically a
party's expectation of the contract."l 3
A problem that arises concerning contracts on the Web is de-
termining what constitutes a signature for contracts that need to be
in writing." 4 Similarly, it has not been determined whether a con-
108. See id. at 1308. For example, in buyer/seller contracts, the buyer would
send an e-mail to the seller confirming the sale of the goods. See id.
109. See id. at 1309 n.108
110. See id. at 1309. "To the sender's chagrin, the language of an e-mail is
often taken literally rather than humorously or figuratively. One collection of ad-
vice to potential owners of commercial sites even recommends that 'if the message
is very important, controversial, or confidential.... think twice about sending it by
way of e-mail and consider the telephone or a face-to-face meeting.'" Id. (quoting
DAVID ANGELL & BRENT HESLOP, THE ELEMENTS OF E-MAIL STYLE 13 (1994)).
111. See id. at 1309 n.108. People often forget that facial expressions and
body language are not conveyed through e-mail. See id. It is important to try to
limit humor and sarcasm in an attempt to make e-mails understood in the way that
they are intended. See id.
112. See Effross, supra note 105, at 1314. This is to eliminate misunderstand-
ings and ensure that parties have the same expectations. See id. at 1314 n.131.
113. See id. (stating, "The institution of commerce in cyberspace, however,
may well lead to a redefinition of the concept of 'locality' for this purpose.").
114. See id. at 1338. This question of what constitutes a signed writing has
recently been answered. President Clinton signed an "E-sign" bill in June 2000.
For further discussion of the E-Sign bill, see infra notes 121-28 and accompanying
text.
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tract formed over the Web is considered to be "in writing." 15 It is
more likely to be considered "in writing" if a copy of the transmis-
sion is saved on the computer's hard drive or if a copy of the con-
tract was printed out and retained.1 6 Other complications that
may arise while contracting over the Internet include: what consti-
tutes proper authentication, offer and acceptance; what to do when
a term in the contract is unconscionable; and how to determine
with whom the contract was made. These differences are just a few
of the many reasons why contracts made over the Web and by e-
mail cannot be regulated in the same way as traditional contracts.
C. New Legislation for Contracting on the Web
Until recently, contracting for services and goods on the Web
was not regulated by any written rules, and no uniform model rules
existed. 117 Within the past year, the rules for contracting on the
Web and the Internet have begun to appear. 11 8 On June 30, 2000,
President Bill Clinton signed the Electronic Signatures in Global
and National Commerce Act.119 Also, the Uniform Computer In-
formation Transaction Act ("UCITA") could become the Uniform
Commercial Code for the Internet.120 Although these two pieces of
115. See Effross, supra note 105, at 1338. It is questionable whether contracts
made via e-mail or on the Web are considered to be in writing for purposes of the
statute of frauds. See id.
116. See id. The status of an e-mail as a "writing" would be increased as a
matter of course if the contract was retained on the computer or printed out. See
id. 117. See A. Michael Froomkin, Article 2B as Legal Software for Electronic Con-
tracting - Operating System or Trojan Horse ?, 13 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 1023, 1024 (1998)
(focusing primarily on digital signatures).
118. Currently, the Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act is being
introduced by many of the fifty states. See UCITA Online, at http://www.ucitaon-
line.com/whatsnu.html. President Bill Clinton approved the electronic signature
bill on June 30, 2000, and it went into effect on October 1, 2000. SeeJohn S. Stolz
& John D. Cromie, The Future is... E-Commerce Gets a Boost with E-Sign (Two Takes):
Now the Subject Turns to Security, 10 Bus. L. TODAY 9 (2001) (describing security
concerns that E-Sign presents). The bill allows consumer contracts to be made
over the Web. See id.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 7000 (2000) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114
Stat. 464); see also Deb Riechman, Clinton to Sign E-Signature Bill, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
June 30, 2000.
120. For further discussion of the Uniform Computer Information Transac-
tion Act, see infra notes 129-59 and accompanying text. The E-signature bill ap-
plies "to any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce . . . ." 15
U.S.C. § 7001 (a). According to section 103(d) (4) of the UCITA, the Act does not
apply to "a contract of employment of an individual, other than an individual
hired as an independent contractor to create or modify computer information,
unless the independent contractor is a freelancer in the news reporting industry as
that term is commonly understood in that industry." UCITA § 103(d) (4).
21
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legislation do not affect agents' contracts on the Web, they may pro-
vide an insightful preview into how Congress and the states may
regulate non-commerce contracts in the future.
1. E-Signature Bill
Recently, one of the major questions concerning contracting
on the Web has been answered. Commercial contracts and finan-
cial documents now may be "signed" over the Internet.192 The law
requires a consumer to agree to sign contracts electronically and to
consent to receive documents over the Web. 122 Companies that
wish to contract via the Web need to verify that the customers have
an e-mail address. 12 3 Companies in the field of technology are rac-
ing against each other to become the first to develop the necessary
technology allowing the E-signature bill to operate to its fullest
ability. 124
This E-signature bill, known as the Electronic Signatures in
Global and National Commerce Act ("E-Sign"), 125 allows a contract
signed in an electronic form to be valid and fully enforceable by a
court of law.1 26 According to E-Sign, an electronic signature is in-
formation or data that is logically associated with an electronic re-
cord that is intended by a party to signify agreement to the
contract.12 7 E-Sign is one of the first uniform bills passed by Con-
121. See Capital Watch: Online-Signature Bill Barrels Through Senate, SEA'rrLE
TIMES, June 17, 2000, atA4. The bill passed through the House by a vote of 426 to
4, and the bill passed through the Senate with a vote of 87 to 0. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id. The customers must have an e-mail address in order for the com-
pany with whom the person is contracting to send the consumer the necessary
technical information.
124. The E-signature bill allows the government and consumers to complete
commercial transactions over the Web.
125. 15 U.S.C. § 7001 (2000).
126. See id. § 7001(a) (1). The E-Sign states:
(a) In general. Notwithstanding any statute, regulation, or other rule of
law (other than this subchapter and subchapter II of this chapter), with
respect to any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce
(1) a signature, contract, or other record relating to such transaction may
not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in
electronic form; and
(2) a contract relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect,
validity, or enforceability solely because an electronic signature or elec-
tronic record was used in its formation.
15 U.S.C. § 7001 (a) (1-2).
127. See Bill Tracking Report, H.R. 1714, 106th Cong. § 103(2). Congress de-
fined the term electronic "as of or relating to technology having electrical, digital,
magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities regardless of medium."
Id.
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gress that attempts to regulate contracting on the Internet; and in
so doing, it enforces electronic signatures as though the parties
signed them in ink. 128
2. The Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act
There is another groundbreaking piece of legislation currently
passing through state legislatures. The Uniform Computer Infor-
mation Transaction Act ("UCITA") is currently progressing
through the State Houses of Representatives and the State Senates
for approval. 129 UCITA deals with several of the aforementioned
problems that are inherent with contracting over the Internet.
Some of the issues addressed by UCITA include: proof of authenti-
cation, requirements of forming a contract, offer and acceptance
over the Internet and determining to whom performance of the
contract is attributed. 30
UCITA cites five purposes.' 3 ' Its first purpose is to support
and facilitate the realization of the full potential of transactions
made via the computer. 132 UCITA's second purpose is to "clarify
the law governing computer information transactions."' 33 The
third purpose is to "enable the expanding commercial practice in
computer information transactions by commercial usage and agree-
ment of the parties."' 3 4 Fourth, the adoption of UCITA hopes to
promote uniformity of law among all of the states with respect to
contracting over the Web.135 Finally, UCITA allows the "continued
128. See 15 U.S.C. § 7001.
129. For a further discussion of the UCITA, see UCITA Online, supra note 118
and accompanying text. Although once UCITA is approved, it will not apply to
service contracts, but it is still useful to understand how contracts will be treated
over the Web. See id. Section 103(d) (4) of UCITA provides that the Act does not
apply to "a contract of employment of an individual, other than an individual
hired as an independent contractor to create or modify computer information,
unless the independent contractor is a freelancer in the news reporting industry as
that term is commonly understood in that industry." Id. § 103(d)(4). Because a
contract between an agent and an athlete is a contract of employment of an indi-
vidual, such a contract would not fall within the UCITA's authority. See id.
130. See generally UCITA Table of Contents.
131. See UCITA § 106(a).
132. See id. § 106(a) (1). The UCITA does not seek to change the basic laws of
traditional contracting even though the contracts are made through the computer.
See UCITA cmt. 106(2).
133. Id. § 106(a) (2).
134. Id. § 106(a) (3).
135. See id. § 106(a) (4).
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expansion of commercial practices in the excluded transactions
through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties."1 36
A major issue covered by UCITA is authenticating an elec-
tronic contract. UCITA allows each party the ability to establish
particular requirements regarding how transmitted information
will be authenticated.1 3 7 If one party desires to put the contract
into writing and refuses to complete the contract over the com-
puter, it is possible for one party to sign the contract over the Web
and the other party to sign a written piece of paper.13 8 Also, parties
may use an electronic agent to bind them to contracts if they so
choose. 139 A reason for using an electronic agent might be that
one party does not have access to a computer, and another reason
might be that the parties are not comfortable using a computer for
any reason. 140 Proving authentication may be done "in any man-
ner, including a showing that a party made use of information or
access that could have been available only if it engaged in conduct
or operations that authenticated the record or term."' 41 This al-
lows the parties to use any evidence available to prove that informa-
tion was sent to them by the opposing party.142
An important issue UCITA discusses is the formation of con-
tracts over the Web. 143 The Act allows a contract to be formed "in
any manner sufficient to show agreement, including offer and ac-
ceptance or conduct of both parties or operations of electronic
agents that recognize the existence of a contract."' 44 Similar to the
UCC, a contract made under UCITA that has one or more terms
136. UCITA § 106(a)(5). UCITA enables contracts to be formed over the
Web that are not covered within the Act. See id. The regulations for these types of
contracts will continue to develop as the contracting parties see fit. As more and
more contracts are made over the Web, a custom and usage will develop. This will
make it easier for the government to regulate contracts made through the com-
puter that are not controlled by UCITA.
137. See id. § 107(c). A record or authentication is not denied legal effect or
enforceability just because it is in electronic form. See id. § 107(a).
138. See UCITA cmt. 107(4). Nothing in the Act requires the parties to use
the same procedure as authenticating an electronic record. See id. In this area, the
Act provides the parties much flexibility.
139. See UCITA § 107(5). For the actions of the electronic agent to be bind-
ing, the agent must be selected consciously by the party. See id.
140. A person who decides to use an electronic agent is bound by the opera-
tions of the agent, even if the individual was unaware of or had not reviewed the
agent's operations or the results of the operations. See id. § 107(d).
141. Id. § 108(a).
142. See UCITA cmt. 108(3). This includes, but is not limited to, the use of a
digital signature. See id.
143. See UCITA §§ 201-11.
144. Id. § 202(a). This section of UCITA is the same as the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. See UCITA cmt. 202(2).
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left open is valid "if the parties intended to make a contract and
there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate
remedy."145
For contracts worth $5000 or more, parties must take extra
steps to ensure that the contract is enforceable. 146 This type of con-
tract is enforceable if "the party against which enforcement is
sought authenticated a record sufficient to indicate that a contract
has been formed and which reasonably identifies the copy or sub-
ject matter to which the contract is in refers,"' 47 or if "the agree-
ment is a license for an agreed duration of one year or less or which
may be terminated at will by the party against which the contract is
asserted."'148 Failure to meet these requirements does not make the
contract void; it merely makes the contract unenforceable by the
court.149
An offer to make a contract on the Web "invites acceptance in
any manner and by any medium reasonable under the circum-
stances.' 50 Usually, an agreement to all terms of the offer or fol-
lowing the instructions provided in the offer constitutes
acceptance.' 5 ' If the offeror does not give instructions on how to
accept an offer, then the acceptance of an offer can be performed
by any reasonable manner. 52 If the offer in an electronic message
requires an electronic message to accept the offer, a contract is
formed when the electronic acceptance is received.' 53
If an acceptance of a contract materially alters the offer, then a
contract is not formed unless the party agrees to the other party's
145. UCITA § 202(c). If the parties intend to make a binding contract even
though there are terms missing, then the contract is valid and enforceable. See
UCITA cmt. 202(4). The contract is not enforceable if there are open terms and if
the parties intended for the contract to become enforceable only when the terms
of the contract are completed. See id.
146. See UCITA § 201(a).
147. Id. § 201(a)(1). A record must indicate that a contract was formed, rea-
sonably identify the subject of the contract and must have been authenticated by
the party by which the action is being brought against. See UCITA cmt. 201 (3) (b).
148. UCITA § 201(a)(2). This section combines the UCC and the common
law. See UCITA cmt. 201 (1). Failure to meet the requirements of this section of
the Act does not make a contract invalid; it merely precludes a party from using
the contract as a defense or bringing a breach of contract action against the other
party. See id.
149. See UCITA cmt. 201(1).
150. UCITA § 203(1).
151. See UCITA cmt. 203(2).
152. See id.
153. See UCITA § 203(4)(A). This is UCITA's version of the "mailbox rule"
used in traditional contract analysis. Once the acceptance is received by the of-
feror, the contract is formed and the contract is enforceable. See id.
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new offer or unless the conduct of the parties establishes a con-
tract. 154 The contract will be enforceable if the intent of the parties
was to be bound to the contract even though the terms varied.
1 55 If
there is a variance in a material term, then the contract was not
formed. 15 6
Under UCITA, an electronic authentication or transmission is
attributed to a person if it was the act of the person or the person's
electronic agent. 157 The party relying on the attribution of an elec-
tronic authentication or transmission has the burden of proving the
attribution. 15 8 The effect of an electronic act attributed to a person
is determined from the context at the time of its creation or execu-
tion, including the parties' agreement. 59
While the E-Sign Bill and the Uniform Computer Information
Transaction Act do not solve all of the major issues and concerns
with contracting on the Web, they are initial steps in providing ef-
fective regulations on the Internet.
V. NCAA RuLEs REGARDING SPORTS AGENTS
The NCAA rules appear to be clear concerning an agent's rela-
tionship with a student-athlete. 160 However, as will be discussed be-
low, the NCAA rules are unclear.' 6 ' Furthermore, the agent's
154. See UCITA § 204(c) (1) (A)-(B). This section of UCITA follows the UCC
§ 2-207(1). See UCITA cmt. 204(2).
155. See UCITA cmt. 204(2). For the contract to be deemed enforceable,
there must have been a definite intention by the parties to make a binding con-
tract. See id.
156. See id.
157. See UCITA § 213(a). The Act is also attributed to a person if the person
is bound by the Act under agency or any other law. See id. For example, if person
"A" gives person "B" his online password, and person "B" makes a contract, the
contract is attributed to person "A" by the actions of person "B" because assent was
given by the act of giving out the password. See UCITA cmt. 213(2). However, if
"B" steals "A's" password, then the actions by "B" are not attributed to "A" because
"A" did not assent. See id.
158. See UCITA § 213(a). To fulfill this burden of proof, the party relying on
the attribution can state that he or she was using a commercially accepted and
reasonable method of attribution. See UCITA cmt. 213(3). This can be rebutted
with evidence that the party neither had a role in the authentication nor allowed
an electronic agent to form a contract. See id.
159. See UCITA § 213(c). This section of UCITA is similar to the UCC in that
parties can rely on the acts of the other party during negotiations and while the
contract is being completed. See id.
160. See NCAA, 2000-2001 NCAA DrVIsIoN I MANUAL (2000) [hereinafter
"NCAA MANuAL"]. The purpose of the NCAA Division I Manual is to govern the
conduct of intercollegiate athletics and to help achieve the objectives of the Associ-
ation. See id. § 2.01.
161. For a discussion of the NCAA rules, see infra notes 167-69 and accompa-
nying text.
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potential use of the Internet and e-mail potentially could blur the
NCAA rules.1
62
According to the NCAA rules, an individual who loses amateur
status is not eligible to compete in intercollegiate athletics. 163 One
way for an individual to lose amateur status would be to enter into
any agreement with a sports agent. 164 The NCAA rule provides that
if an individual has ever agreed either orally or in writing to be
represented by an agent for the purpose of marketing his or her
athletic ability in that sport, that person is declared ineligible from
competing in that NCAA sport.165 Additionally, a student-athlete
will lose amateur status if he or she enters into a contract, orally or
in writing, with an agent for representation in future professional
sports negotiations. 166
The rules are clear that a student-athlete cannot make an oral
or written contract with an agent. However, it is unclear as to what
constitutes permissible contact between an agent and a student-ath-
162. For a discussion of the use of the Internet regarding sports agents' con-
tacts with collegiate athletes, see infra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
163. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 160, § 12.1.1 (listing six general actions
which would cause student-athlete to lose amateur status).
164. See id. § 12.1.1(f). However, the NCAA Manual never defines the term
"agent." See id. This potentially could cloud further the NCAA's hope of having
clear rules concerning an agent's relationship with student-athletes. See id.
165. See id. § 12.3.1. The rule states:
An individual shall be ineligible for participation in an intercollegiate
sport if he or she ever has agreed (orally or in writing) to be represented
by an agent for the purpose of marketing his or her athletics ability or
reputation in that sport. Further, an agency contract not specifically lim-
ited in writing to a sport or particular sports shall be deemed applicable
to all sports, and the individual shall be ineligible to participate in any
sport.
Id.
166. See id. § 12.3.1.1. The rule states:
An individual shall be ineligible per Bylaw 12.3.1 if he or she enters into a
verbal or written agreement with an agent for representation in future
professional sports negotiations that are to take place after the individual
has completed his or her eligibility in that sport.
Id. Furthermore, student-athletes will be declared ineligible if they, their families
or friends accept a benefit from a prospective agent. See id. § 12.3.1.2.
An individual shall be ineligible per Bylaw 12.3.1 if he or she (or his or
her relatives or friends) accepts transportation or other benefits from:
(a) Any person who represents any individual in the marketing of his or
her athletics ability. The receipt of such expenses constitutes com-
pensation based on athletics skill and is an extra benefit not available
to the student body in general; or
(b) An agent, even if the agent has indicated that he or she has no inter-
est in representing the student-athlete in the marketing of his or her
athletics ability or reputation and does not represent individuals in
the student-athlete's sport.
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lete. Following a strict reading of the NCAA rules, it appears as
though an agent and a student-athlete may converse about anything
other than a contract for future representation. 167 Additionally,
the student-athlete is prohibited from accepting benefits or trans-
portation from an agent. 168 This does not seem to make much
sense. An agent and a student-athlete can meet and talk about al-
most anything for four months, and the student-athlete will not lose
NCAA eligibility. Yet, if the agent gives the student-athlete a ride
from the gymnasium to his or her dorm room, the athlete will lose
eligibility. 169
The NCAA rules do not discuss whether an agent is authorized
to contact a student-athlete via the Internet or e-mail without jeop-
ardizing the student's NCAA eligibility. It has been established that
contracts can be made via the Internet and what jurisdiction would
be applicable to that contract.1 70 Therefore, common sense leads
one to believe that a student-athlete who makes a contract over the
Internet with an agent will lose eligibility in NCAA athletics.1 71
The question, therefore, becomes: What communication be-
tween an agent and a student-athlete is permissible via the Internet?
May an agent and a student-athlete communicate over e-mail with-
out jeopardizing the student-athlete's eligibility? It is clear from the
language of UCITA and the E-Sign Bill that a contract can be
formed by way of e-mail.1 72 A strict reading of the NCAA rules
would seem to allow any communication between an agent and a
student-athlete until they make a contract for future
representation. 17 3
Another use of the Internet and the Web is the construction
and use of a Web site. An agent could construct a Web site that
would serve as an advertisement of his or her services and current
167. For a further discussion of the NCAA rules regarding agent contact with
a student-athlete, see supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
168. For a further discussion of the NCAA rules regarding benefits, see supra
notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
169. For a further discussion of the NCAA rule regarding benefits from a pro-
spective agent, see supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
170. For a comprehensive analysis of personal jurisdiction over the Internet,
see supra notes 42-77 and accompanying text.
171. See NCAA MANuAL, supra note 160, § 12.3.1.2. However, the NCAA Man-
ual does not discuss specifically making a contract over the Internet.
172. For further discussion regarding the E-Sign Bill and UCITA, see supra
notes 117-59 and accompanying text.
173. See NCAA MANuAL, supra note 160, § 12.3.1. For further discussion of
NCAA Bylaws 12.3.1 and 12.3.1.1, see supra notes 163-73 and accompanying text.
Such communication between an agent and a student-athlete would be in writing.
See id.
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clientele in order to attract future players to represent. Student-
athletes could then link onto the Web sites while they are surfing
on the Internet. A strict reading of the NCAA rules would not con-
sider this a violation. 174
Both of these interactions, however, may be considered a viola-
tion of the NCAA rules.' 75 There is a clear intent by the NCAA
rules to limit direct unsupervised communication between an agent
and a student-athlete. 176 It is very likely that the drafters of the
NCAA rules did not consider the existence of the Internet, let alone
the ability to make contracts through e-mail. In the subsequent
NCAA rules, it is likely that there will have to be new bylaws that will
directly cover communications between an agent and a student-ath-
lete over the Internet and an agent's use of the Internet in setting
up Web sites.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the technological age and regulations governing the In-
ternet evolve, the law governing contracts made electronically will
become less amorphous. The courts are beginning to apply tradi-
tional notions of personal jurisdiction to transactions occurring
174. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 160, § 12.3.1. Because there is no direct
communication between the agent and the student-athlete, no agreement could
be reached. See id.
175. See id. § 12.3.4(f).
176. See id. Bylaw 12.3.4 provides:
It is permissible for an authorized institutional professional sports coun-
seling panel to:
(a) Advise a student-athlete about a future professional career;
(b) Provide direction on securing a loan for the purpose of purchasing
insurance against a debilitating injury;
(c) Review a proposed professional sports contract;
(d) Meet with the student-athlete and representatives of professional
teams;
(e) Communicate directly (e.g., in-person, by mail or telephone) with
representatives of a professional athletics team to assist in securing a try-
out with that team for a student-athlete;
(f) Assist the student-athlete in the selection of an agent by participating
with the student-athlete in interviews of agents, by reviewing written infor-
mation player agents send to the student-athlete and by having direct
communication with those individuals who can comment about the abili-
ties of an agent (e.g., other agents, a professional league's players' associ-
ation); and
(g) Visit with player agents or representatives of professional athletics
teams to assist the student-athlete in determining his or her market value
(e.g., potential salary, draft status).
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over the Internet.177 In addition, as evidenced by congressional in-
tent, the federal government is pushing towards having a uniform
standard affecting e-commerce and e-contracts.178 While Congress
is enacting legislation affecting e-commerce and e-contracts, states
are also enacting uniform legislation to assist in innovative forms of
contracting. 179
The NCAA, meanwhile, must update its own rules to deter-
mine what contact between sports agents and student-athletes via
electronic media will be tolerated. 180 Subsequently, the NCAA
must update its bylaws to accommodate such contact. In the
meantime, the NCAA bylaws are unclear as to what electronic con-
tact between the agent and the student-athlete is permitted. If
sports agents are going to continue interacting with lucrative stu-
dent-athletes, there must be a clear determination of the standards
by which agents and athletes need to abide.
177. For an intricate discussion of personal jurisdiction regarding transac-
tions over the Internet, see supra notes 18-77 and accompanying text.
178. For an overview of the E-Sign bill, see supra notes 121-28 and accompany-
ing text.
179. For an analysis of UCITA, see supra notes 129-59 and accompanying text.
180. For a review of the NCAA rules regarding contacts between sports agents
and student-athletes, see supra notes 160-76.
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